Telecare medicine information system (TMIS) can provide remote users with high-quality services at home. Hence, it is not easy to ensure the user information security in the complex network environment. This paper proposes a new biometric-based, mutual authenticated certificateless key agreement protocol for TMIS to protect user information security. The protocol is based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem under the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) security model. And the protocol uses biological imprinting to provide more security for users. Meanwhile, the protocol can resist all kind of existing attack. Compared with the existing key agreement protocol, the protocol has higher computing and communication efficiency.
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